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A NETWORK APPROACH TO PUBLIC GOODS
MATTHEW ELLIOTT AND BENJAMIN GOLUB
Abstract. Suppose agents can exert costly effort that creates nonrival, heterogeneous
benefits for each other. At each possible outcome, a weighted, directed network de-
scribing marginal externalities is defined. We show that Pareto efficient outcomes are
those at which the largest eigenvalue of the network is 1. An important set of efficient
solutions—Lindahl outcomes—are characterized by contributions being proportional to
agents’ eigenvector centralities in the network. The outcomes we focus on are motivated
by negotiations. We apply the results to identify who is essential for Pareto improve-
ments, how to efficiently subdivide negotiations, and whom to optimally add to a team.
When economic agents produce public goods, mitigate public bads, or more generally
create externalities, the incidence of the externalities is often heterogeneous across those
affected. A nation’s economic policies—e.g., implementing a fiscal stimulus, legislating
environmental regulations, or reducing trade barriers—benefit foreign economies differ-
ently. Investments by a firm in research yield different spillovers for various producers and
consumers. Cities’ mitigation of pollution matters most for neighbors sharing the same
environmental resources. And within a firm, an employee’s efforts (e.g., toward team
production) will benefit other employees to different degrees. How does heterogeneity in
the incidence of externalities translate into outcomes? Which agents contribute the most
and least? Whose effort is particularly critical?
An active research program addresses these questions by modeling agents playing a
Nash equilibrium of a one-shot public goods game, in which they unilaterally choose
how much effort to put forth; see, e.g., Ballester, Calvo´-Armengol, and Zenou (2006),
Bramoulle´, Kranton, and D’Amours (2014), and Allouch (2015, 2013). These works model
externalities via particular functional forms in which a network is a set of parameters.
Links describe the pairs of players who directly affect each other’s payoffs or incentives, as
when two people collaborate on a project. The main results then characterize equilibrium
effort levels via certain network statistics. Since these statistics are major subjects of
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study in their own right, the connection yields a rich set of intuitions, as well as analytical
techniques for comparative statics, identifying “key players,” and various other policy
analyses.1
We argue that it is valuable to also study different classes of solutions in a public
goods economy—ones motivated by negotiations—and, paralleling the results above, to
understand how network properties matter for these solutions. The static Nash equilib-
rium is a benchmark relevant in cases where decisions are unilateral, with limited scope
for repetition or commitment. Under this solution concept, agents do not internalize
the externalities of their effort. Indeed, in a public goods game, players free-ride on the
contributions of others, leading to a classic “tragedy of the commons” problem. The re-
sulting inefficiencies can be substantial; in the context of problems like climate change,
some argue they are disastrous. In cases where large gains can be realized by improving
on the unilateral benchmark, institutions arise precisely to foster multilateral coopera-
tion. Global summits,2 the World Trade Organization, research consortia, and corpo-
rate team-building practices all aim to mitigate free-riding by facilitating commitment.
Therefore, rather than working with the static Nash equilibrium, this paper focuses on
the complementary benchmark of Pareto efficient public goods provision in the presence
of nonuniform externalities.
Our contribution is to show that taking a network perspective on the system of ex-
ternalities sheds new light on efficient outcomes and the scope for efficient cooperation.
First, we provide a new characterization of when Pareto improvements are possible, which
relates such improvements to cycles of favor-trading, quantified in a suitable way. Second,
we characterize certain efficient solutions—the Lindahl outcomes, which have microfoun-
dations in terms of negotiation games. Our results describe agents’ contributions at these
outcomes in terms of their positions in the network of externalities. The insights that
the analysis generates can help address questions such as who should be given a seat at
the negotiating table or admitted to a team. In contrast to the previous work mentioned
above, our characterizations are non-parametric: A “network” representation of marginal
externality incidence arises naturally from general utility functions. Finally, we provide
new economic foundations and intuitions for statistics that are widely used to measure
the centrality of agents in a network by relating these statistics to concepts such as Pareto
weights and market prices.
1. Example and Roadmap
We now present the essentials of the model in a simplified example. Section 2 defines all
the primitives formally in the general case. Each agent has a one-dimensional effort/action
choice, ai ≥ 0; it is costly for an agent to provide effort, which yields positive, non-rival
externalities for (some) others. For a concrete example, suppose there are three towns: X,
Y and Z, located as shown in Figure 1a, each generating air and water pollution during
1There are many empirical applications of these results. See, for example, Calvo´-Armengol, Patacchini,
and Zenou (2009) and Acemoglu, Garc´ıa-Jimeno, and Robinson (2014). Other theoretical papers that
examine different issues related to the provision of public goods on networks include Bramoulle´ and
Kranton (2007) and Galeotti and Goyal (2010).
2For example, it was at the Rio Earth Summit that the first international treaty on climate change was
hammered out. There have been several other summits and associated climate change agreements since.
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Figure 1. In this illustration of the framework, towns benefit from each
other’ pollution reduction. Town i benefits from j’s pollution reduction if
pollution travels from j to i, which can happen via the wind or via the
flow of the river. Let Bij = ∂ui/∂aj be the marginal benefit to i from j’s
reduction (per unit of i’s marginal cost, which is normalized to be 1). These
numbers may vary with the action profile, (aX , aY , aZ).
production. Because of the direction of the prevailing wind, the air pollution of a town
affects only those east of it. A river flows westward, so Z’s water pollution affects X but
not Y, which is located away from the river.
Town i can forgo ai ≥ 0 units of production at a net cost of a dollar per unit, reducing
its pollution and creating positive externalities for others affected by that pollution. The
important part of this assumption is that the value of forgone production outweighs private
environmental benefits; this assumes that the net private benefits of increasing effort have
already been exhausted if they were present. Let ui(aX, aY, aZ) denote i’s payoff.
Suppose the leaders of the towns attend a summit to try to agree on improvements that
will benefit all of them. We focus on like-for-like agreements, in which agents trade favors
by providing the public good of effort to each other, which is a relevant case for many
practical negotiations.3 We begin by studying the set of all outcomes that are Pareto
efficient and how they can be characterized in terms of the structure of externalities.
The conceptual platform for this—and for the rest of the paper—is to analyze a matrix
whose entries record the marginal benefits per unit of marginal cost that each agent can
confer on each other, for a given action profile. In our example, the entries of this matrix
are Bij(a) =
∂ui
∂aj
(a)/
(
−∂ui
∂ai
(a)
)
= ∂ui
∂aj
(a) for i 6= j, since we have normalized all marginal
costs of effort to be 1. The diagonal terms of the matrix are set to 0, so that it records
only the externalities between players, and not their own costs. This benefits matrix can
be equivalently represented as a (weighted, directed) network, where a link from i to j
3This also parallels the above-mentioned papers regarding games on networks, which study one-
dimensional contributions. In Section 2 of the Online Appendix we consider transfers: the very simple
benchmark of quasi-linear preferences, as well as the general case, where our main results have natural
analogues.
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represents that i’s effort affects j’s welfare (see Figure 1b). That network is the key object
whose statistics we will relate to economic outcomes.
Our first result shows that an interior action profile a is Pareto efficient if and only if
1 is a largest eigenvalue of B(a). The reason for this is as follows: The matrix B(a) is a
linear system describing how investments translate into returns at the margin. Consider
a particular sequence of investments: In Figure 1b, Z can increase its action slightly and
provide a marginal benefit to X. Then X, in turn, can “pass forward” some of the resulting
increase in its utility, investing costly effort to help Z and Y. Finally, Y can also pass
forward some of the increase in his utility by increasing his action, creating further benefits
for Z. If they can all receive back more than they invest in such a multilateral adjustment,
then the starting point is not Pareto efficient. It is in such cases that the linear system
B(a) is “expansive”: There is scope for everyone to get more out of it than they put in.
And an expansive system is characterized by having a largest eigenvalue exceeding 1. If the
largest eigenvalue of B(a) is less than 1, then everyone can be made better off by reducing
investment. As a result, the interior Pareto efficient outcomes have a benefits matrix with
a largest eigenvalue exactly equal to 1. Section 3.1 makes this discussion rigorous (see
Proposition 1). Section 3.2 develops some of its interpretations and applications. It fleshes
out the idea, already suggested by the informal argument, that cycles in the benefits
network are critical for Pareto improvements and, correspondingly, that they determine
the size of the largest eigenvalue. Lastly, it discusses a simple algorithm to find the players
who are essential to a negotiation—in the sense that without their participation, there
is no Pareto improvement on the status quo. They are the ones whose removal causes
a large disruption of cycles in the benefits network, as measured by the decrease in its
largest eigenvalue.
One point on the Pareto frontier that is of particular interest is the classic Lindahl
solution that completes the “missing markets” for externalities. If all externalities were
instead tradable goods, we could consider the Walrasian outcome and identify the set
of prices at which the market clears. If personalized taxes and subsidies equivalent to
these prices could be charged in our public goods setting, then the same efficient outcome
would obtain. Such an allocation is called a Lindahl outcome.4 Our second main result
characterizes the Lindahl outcomes in terms of the eigenvector centralities of nodes in the
marginal benefits network.
Eigenvector centrality is a way to impute importance to nodes in a network. Given a
network G, the eigenvector centrality of node i satisfies:5
(1) ci ∝
∑
j Gijcj.
This equation says that i’s centrality is proportional to a weighted sum of its neighbors’
centralities. Thus the definition is a fixed-point condition and, in vector notation, be-
comes λc = Gc for some constant λ, so that the centralities of players are a right-hand
eigenvector of the network G. The measure captures the idea that central agents are
those with strong connections to other central agents; equation (1) is simply a linear ver-
sion of this statement. The notion of eigenvector centrality recurs in a large variety of
applications in various disciplines, and our main conceptual contribution is to relate it in
4A formal definition of Lindahl outcomes appears in Section 4.
5Under a network connectedness condition, these equations pin down relative centralities uniquely.
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a simple and general way to price equilibria. At the end of this section we expand briefly
on this point.
In our setting, we say an action profile has the centrality property, or equivalently is a
centrality action profile if
(2) a = B(a)a.
We let the word “centrality” stand for eigenvector centrality, and distinguish it explicitly
from other kinds of centrality when necessary. Theorem 1 (in Section 4) establishes that
Lindahl outcomes are exactly those with the centrality property. One way to interpret
condition (2) is that i contributes in proportion to a weighted sum of others’ contributions
aj; the weights are i’s marginal valuations of the efforts of other agents.
Section 5 shows that the eigenvector condition (2) can be expressed in terms of walks
in the benefits network, with the more central agents being those who sit at the locus
of larger direct and indirect incoming marginal benefit flows. This relates price-based
outcomes to the structure of the network. Building on this interpretation, Theorem 1 is
applied to study a problem in which a team has to decide which new member to admit. As
another application, we study cases in which we can calculate the centrality action profiles
explicitly. This, in turn, is used to give several important network centrality measures an
economic microfoundation and interpretation in terms of price equilibria.6 This exercise
echoes the general conceptual message of Theorem 1—that there is a close connection
between markets and network centrality—but for a wider range of network statistics and
in a case where centralities can be computed explicitly in terms of exogenous parameters.
The Lindahl equilibria are of interest on more than just normative grounds. In Section
4.2 we review theories of negotiation that provide strategic foundations for this solution
concept. First, using ideas from the literature on Walrasian bargaining (especially Da´vila,
Eeckhout, and Martinelli (2009) and Penta (2011)), we consider a model of multilateral
negotiations that selects the Lindahl outcomes from the Pareto frontier. We then apply
ideas of Hurwicz (1979a,b) on implementation theory to show that the Lindahl equilibria
are those selected by all mechanisms that are optimal in a certain sense. Finally, we note
that, in our setting, Lindahl outcomes are robust to coalitional deviations—i.e., are in an
appropriately defined core.
We close by putting our work in a broader context of research on networks and cen-
trality, beyond the most closely related papers on externalities and public goods. The
interdependence of economic interactions is a defining feature of economies. When a firm
does more business it might employ more workers, who then have more income to spend
on other goods, and so on. Eigenvector centrality (equation 1) loosely captures this idea.
While in broad terms prior results suggest a connection between eigenvector centrality
and economic outcomes, those results’ reliance on parametric assumptions leaves open the
possibility that the connection exists only in special cases, and is heavily dependent on the
functional forms. Our contribution is to show that the connection between centrality and
markets goes deeper by formalizing it in a simple model without parametric assumptions.
In doing this, we give a new economic angle on a concept that has been the subject of
6Relatedly, Du, Lehrer, and Pauzner (2015) show how a ranking problem for locations on an unweighted
graph can be studied via an associated perfectly competitive exchange economy in which agents have
Cobb–Douglas utility functions. We discuss the connection in more detail in Section 5.3.
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much study. In sociology, key contributions on eigenvector-type centrality measures in-
clude Katz (1953), Bonacich (1987), and Friedkin (1991). For a survey of applications and
results on network centrality from computer science and applied mathematics, especially
for ranking problems, see Langville and Meyer (2012).7 Other applications include identi-
fying those sectors in the macroeconomy that contribute the most to aggregate volatility
via a network of intersectoral linkages (Acemoglu, Carvalho, Ozdaglar, and Tahbaz-Salehi,
2012); analyzing communication in teams (Prat, de Mart´ı, and Calvo´-Armengol, 2015);
and the measurement of intellectual influence (Palacios-Huerta and Volij, 2004). The
last paper discusses axiomatic foundations of eigenvector centrality; other work taking an
axiomatic approach includes Altman and Tennenholtz (2005) and Dequiedt and Zenou
(2014).
We discuss other closely related literature in more detail at those points where we
expect the comparisons to be most helpful. Omitted proofs and some supporting analyses
are deferred to appendices.
2. Framework
2.1. The Environment. There is a set of agents or players, N = {1, 2, . . . , n}. The
outcome is determined by specifying an action, ai ∈ R+, for each agent i.8 Taking a higher
action may be interpreted as doing more of something that helps the other agents—for
instance, mitigating pollution. Agent i has a utility function ui : Rn+ → R, where ui
is concave and continuously differentiable; agent i’s payoff when the action profile a is
played is written ui(a).
2.2. Main Assumptions. The following four assumptions are maintained in all results
of the paper, unless a result explicitly states a different set of assumptions. Section
6.1 discusses the extent to which some of our more economically restrictive explicit and
implicit assumptions can be weakened.
Assumption 1 (Costly Actions). Each player finds it costly to invest effort, holding
others’ actions fixed: ∂ui
∂ai
(a) < 0 for any a ∈ Rn+ and i ∈ N .
Our results go through if efforts are required to be only weakly costly at the status
quo. That allows us to interpret the status quo actions as an arbitrary Nash equilibrium
of a game in which agents simultaneously choose how much effort to exert. We defer the
technical issues associated with this generalization to Section 5.2.
Assumption 2 (Positive Externalities). Increasing any player’s action level weakly ben-
efits all other players: ∂ui
∂aj
(a) ≥ 0 for any a ∈ Rn+ whenever j 6= i.
Because the externalities are positive and nonrival, this is a public goods environment.
Together, the two assumptions we have introduced—Positive Externalities and Costly
7Perhaps the most famous application of eigenvector centrality is the PageRank measure introduced as
a part of Google’s early algorithms to rank search results (Brin and Page, 1998). For early antecedents
of using eigenvectors as a way to “value” or rank nodes, see Wei (1952) and Kendall (1955).
8We use R+ (respectively, R++) to denote the set of nonnegative (respectively, positive) real numbers.
We write Rn+ (respectively, Rn++) for the set of vectors v with n entries such that each entry is in R+
(respectively, R++). When we write an inequality between vectors, e.g., v > w, that means the inequality
holds coordinate by coordinate, i.e., vi > wi for each i ∈ N .
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Actions—imply that Pareto efficient outcomes will not be achieved if they are not equal to
the status quo: The assumption of costly actions implies that the unique Nash equilibrium
of a game in which players choose their actions entails that everyone contributes nothing
(ai = 0 for each i), even though other outcomes may Pareto dominate this one due to
Positive Externalities—if those externalities are large enough.
One interpretation of the action profile a = 0 is as a status quo at which negotiations
begin. An alternative interpretation is that it is a Nash equilibrium in which everyone
has already exhausted their private gains from exerting effort. We explore this second
interpretation in Section 5.2, and to accommodate it, relax Assumption 1 to allow agents
to have exactly zero net private benefits from increasing actions at the status quo.
Two additional technical assumptions are useful:
Assumption 3 (Connectedness of Benefits). For all a ∈ Rn+, if M is a nonempty proper
subset of N , then there exist i ∈ M and j /∈ M (which may depend on a) such that
∂ui
∂aj
(a) > 0.
This posits that it is not possible to find an outcome and partition society into two
nonempty groups such that, at that outcome, one group does not derive any marginal
benefit from the effort of the other group.9
Finally, we assume that the set of points where everybody wants to scale up all effort
levels is bounded. To state this, we introduce a few definitions. Under a utility profile u,
action profile a′ ∈ Rn+ Pareto dominates another profile a ∈ Rn+ if ui(a′) ≥ ui(a) for all
i ∈ N , and the inequality is strict for some i. We say a′ strictly Pareto dominates a if
ui(a
′) > ui(a) for all i ∈ N and that a is Pareto efficient (or simply efficient) if no other
action profile Pareto dominates it.
Assumption 4 (Bounded Improvements). The set
{a ∈ Rn+ : there is an s > 1 so that sa strictly Pareto dominates a}
is bounded.10
This assumption is necessary to keep the problem well-behaved and ensure the existence
of a Pareto frontier, as well as of solutions to a bargaining problem we will study.11 It
is implied by, but weaker than, assuming an Inada condition whereby for high enough
actions, marginal benefits become very low.
2.3. Key Notions. We write u = (u1, u2, . . . , un) for a profile of utility functions. The
Jacobian, J(a; u), is the n-by-n matrix whose (i, j) entry is Jij(a; u) = ∂ui(a)/∂aj. The
benefits matrix B(a; u) is then defined as follows:
Bij(a; u) =
{
Jij(a;u)
−Jii(a;u) if i 6= j
0 otherwise.
As discussed in the roadmap, when i 6= j, the quantity Bij(a; u) is i’s marginal rate of
substitution between decreasing own effort and receiving help from j. In other words, it
9See Section 6 of the Online Appendix for a discussion of extending the analysis when this assumption
does not hold.
10This condition is weaker than assuming that the set of Pareto efficient outcomes is bounded.
11For details, see Section 4.2 and particularly the proof of Proposition 2.
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is how much i values the help of j, measured in the number of units of effort that i would
be willing to put forth in order to receive one unit of j’s effort.
Suppose u satisfies the assumptions of Section 2.2. Since Jii(a; u) < 0 by Assumption
1, the benefits matrix is well-defined. Assumptions 1 and 2 imply that it is entrywise
nonnegative. Assumption 3 is equivalent to the statement that this matrix is irreducible12
at every a.
In discussing both the Jacobian and the benefits matrix, when there is no ambiguity
about what u is, we suppress it.
For any nonnegative matrix M, we define r(M) as the maximum of the magnitudes of
the eigenvalues of M, also called the spectral radius. That is,
r(M) = max{|λ| : λ is an eigenvalue of M},
where |λ| denotes the absolute value of the complex number λ. By the Perron–Frobenius
Theorem (see Appendix A for a statement), any such matrix has a real, positive eigenvalue
equal to r(M). Thus, we may equivalently think of r(M) as the largest eigenvalue of M
on the real line.
This quantity can be interpreted as a single measure of how expansive a matrix is as a
linear operator—how much it can scale up vectors that it acts on. When applied to the
benefits matrix B, it will identify the scope for Pareto improvements.
3. Efficiency and the Spectral Radius
The thesis of this paper is that we can gain insight about efficient solutions to public
goods problems by constructing, for any action profile a under consideration, a network
in which the agents are nodes and the weighted links among them measure the marginal
benefits available by increasing actions. The adjacency matrix of this network is B(a).
This section offers support for the thesis by showing that an important statistic of
this network—the size of the largest eigenvalue—can be used to diagnose whether an
outcome is Pareto efficient (Section 3.1). After presenting this general result, we discuss
interpretations (especially in terms of the structure of the network) and applications.
3.1. A Characterization of Pareto Efficiency. Our main result on efficiency is the
following.
Proposition 1.
(i) Under Assumptions 1, 2, and 3, an interior action profile a ∈ Rn++ is Pareto
efficient if and only if the spectral radius of B(a) is 1.
(ii) Under Assumptions 1 and 2, the outcome 0 is Pareto efficient if and only if
r(B(0)) ≤ 1.
One argument for this result makes precise the intuition presented in the roadmap:
when the spectral radius is greater than 1, we can obtain a Pareto improvement if one
agent increases his action, generating benefits for others, and then other agents “pass
forward” some of the benefits they receive. For simplicity, we will work with claim (i) in
the proposition, deferring (ii) to the proof in Appendix C. Fix any a ∈ Rn++ and drop
12A matrix M is irreducible if it is not possible to find a nonempty proper subset S of indices so that
Mij = 0 for every i ∈ S and j /∈ S.
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it in arguments; write ρ for the spectral radius of B(a). Then by the Perron-Frobenius
Theorem and the maintained assumptions, there is a d ∈ Rn++ such that Bd = ρd.
Multiplying each row of this matrix inequality by −Jii(a), we find that for each i,∑
j 6=i
∂ui
∂aj
dj + ρ
∂ui
∂ai
di = 0.
If ρ > 1, then using the assumption of Costly Actions (∂ui
∂ai
< 0) we deduce
(3)
∑
j 6=i
∂ui
∂aj
dj +
∂ui
∂ai
di > 0,
showing that a slight change where each i increases his action by the amount di yields a
Pareto improvement. The vector d describes the relative magnitudes of contributions to
make the passing forward of benefits work out to achieve a Pareto improvement. Note
that it is key to the argument that d is positive.13 The conditions of the Perron-Frobenius
Theorem guarantee the positivity of d, though weaker conditions are known—see Section
6.1. If ρ < 1, we reason similarly to conclude the inequality (3) when each i slightly
decreases his action by the amount di.
The key step not shown by the argument so far is that if ρ(B(a)) = 1 then a is
Pareto efficient. To show this, note that by the Perron-Frobenius Theorem, the condition
ρ(B(a)) = 1 implies the existence of a left-hand eigenvector θ of B(a), with all positive
entries, satisfying θB(a) = θ. This can readily be rearranged into the equation θJ(a) = 0,
which is the system of first-order conditions for the problem of maximizing
∑
i θiui(a) by
choosing a. Since the first-order conditions hold for the vector of weights θ and the
maximization problem is concave, it follows that a is Pareto efficient.
A complete proof of Proposition 1 is in Appendix C.
Proposition 1 shows that we can diagnose whether an outcome is Pareto efficient using
just the spectral radius of the benefits matrix, dispensing with the construct of Pareto
weights. Moreover, the spectral radius provides more than just qualitative information;
it can also be interpreted as a quantitative measure of the size of the inefficiency. In
particular, the spectral radius measures the best return on investment in public goods
per unit of cost that can simultaneously be achieved for all agents. Details on this can
be found in Appendix B. We axiomatize the spectral radius of the benefits matrix as a
measure of marginal (in)efficiency in a sister paper, Elliott and Golub (2015).
The condition θB(a∗) = θ says that, for each i, we have θi =
∑
j θjBji. That is, i’s
Pareto weight is equal to the sum of the various other Pareto weights, with θj weighted
by Bij(a
∗), which measures how much j cares about i’s contribution. This echoes the
definition of eigenvector centrality from Section 1; indeed, θ is the eigenvector centrality
of the network B(a∗)T. Thus a planner maximizes the weighted sum of utilities, with
weights θ, by having the agents take actions so that in the transpose of the induced
benefits network each agent’s centrality is equal to his Pareto weight. Correspondingly,
in the transpose of the benefits networks at a Pareto efficient outcomes, each agent’s
centrality reveals his implied weighting by a planner.
13If its entries had different signs, then Bd − ρd > 0 would not imply anything useful about Pareto
improvements, because the second term would not move uniformly in one direction when replacing ρ by
1.
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The condition that the spectral radius of B(a) is 1 is independent of how different
players’ cardinal utilities are measured—as, of course, it must be, since Pareto efficiency
is an ordinal notion. To see how the benefits matrix changes under reparameterizations of
cardinal utility, suppose we define, for each i ∈ N , new utility functions ûi(a) = fi(ui(a))
for some differentiable, strictly increasing functions fi. If we let B̂ be the benefits matrix
obtained from these new utility functions, then B(a) = B̂(a); this follows by applying the
chain rule to the numerator and denominator in the definition of the benefits matrix.
3.1.1. Relation to Utilitarian Surplus. It is worth comparing our condition for Pareto
efficiency to the condition for efficiency from the perspective of a utilitarian planner who
places equal weights on all players. Assume for this discussion that ∂ui/∂ai = −1, so
that all agents’ utilities are normalized to make the costs of contribution equal in utiles.
Then there is a utilitarian improvement if and only if some column of B(a) has a sum
not equal to 1.14 This condition is very different from the spectral radius being different
from 1, though utilitarian efficiency (all column sums equaling 1) does, of course, imply
Pareto efficiency (the spectral radius equaling 1).
Some further general statements can be made, however: If all the column sums of B(a)
are less than 1 (the utilitarian marginal surplus of every agent’s contribution is less than
1), the spectral radius of B(a) is less than 1 (Takayama, 1985, corollary to Theorem
4.C.11) and a Pareto improvement can be achieved. Similarly, if all column sums of B(a)
exceed 1, the spectral radius of B(a) exceeds 1 and there is also guaranteed to be a Pareto
improvement. However, when some columns of B(a) have sums exceeding 1 and others do
not, there is no simple relation between these sums and Pareto improvements, or even the
possibility of Pareto improvements. We discuss these issues further in Elliott and Golub
(2015).
3.2. Essential Players. Are there any players that are essential to negotiations in our
setting and, if so, how can we identify them?
The efficiency results of Section 3.1 suggest a simple way of characterizing how essential
any given player is to the negotiations. Suppose for a moment that a given player exoge-
nously may or may not be able to participate in an institution to negotiate an outcome
that Pareto dominates the status quo. If he is not able, then his action is set to the status
quo level of ai = 0. How much does such an exclusion hurt the prospects for cooperation
by the other agents?
Without player i, the benefits matrix at the status quo of 0 is equal to the original B(0)
without row and column i; equivalently, each entry in that row and column may be set
to 0. Call a matrix constructed that way B[−i](0). The spectral radius of B[−i](0) is no
greater than that of B(0). In terms of consequences for efficiency, the most dramatic case
is one in which the spectral radius of B(0) exceeds 1 but the spectral radius of B[−i](0)
is less than 1. Then by Proposition 1(ii), a Pareto improvement on 0 exists when i is
present but not when i is absent.
This argument shows that all players weakly improve the scope for Pareto improvements
and a player i’s participation is essential to achieving any Pareto improvement on the
status quo precisely when his removal changes the spectral radius of the benefits matrix
14If the sum of column j exceeds 1, the utilitarian marginal social surplus of j increasing his contribution,∑
i 6=j ∂ui/∂aj , exceeds the social cost, which is 1. The argument for the other inequality is similar.
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at the status quo from being greater than 1 to being less than 1. To directly apply this
result involves calculating the spectral radius of many counterfactual benefits matrices. Is
there a way in which we instead identify essential players by simply eyeballing the benefits
network?
As noted in the roadmap, a cycle of players such that each can help the next creates
scope for cooperation. When there are no cycles of cooperation at the status quo actions
there is no way to simultaneously compensate all members of any set of agents for taking
positive effort, and no Pareto improvements are possible. Such a situation corresponds to
the benefits matrix having a spectral radius of 0 at the status quo actions, and so the lack
of cycles is directly tied to the spectral radius. Thus a sufficient condition for a player to
be essential is for that player to be part of all cycles.
To illustrate this, consider the following example in which N = {1, 2, 3, 4}.
B(0) =

0 0 7 0.5
5 0 6 0.5
0 0 0 0.5
0.5 0.5 0.5 0

1
23
4
5
6
7
0.5
0.5 0.5
Figure 2. A benefits matrix B(0) and its graphical depiction, in which
player #4 is essential despite providing smaller benefits than the others.
The import of the example is that player 4, even though he confers the smallest marginal
benefits, is the only essential player. Without him, there are no cycles at all and the
spectral radius of the corresponding benefits matrix B[−4](0) is 0. On the other hand,
when he is present but any one other player (i 6= 4) is absent, then there is a cycle
whose edges multiply to more than 1, and the spectral radius of B[−i](0) exceeds 1. Thus,
the participation of a seemingly “small” player in negotiations can make an essential
difference to the ability to improve on the status quo when that player completes cycles
in the benefits network.
The example suggests that we might be able to reinterpret Proposition 1 in terms of
the cycles that are present in the benefits matrix. However, the example is particularly
stark—player 4 is involved in all cycles. More generally how do different cycles feed
into the spectral radius and can we use that connection to identify essential players? A
standard fact permits a general and useful interpretation (for background and a proof,
see, e.g., Milnor (2001)).
Fact 1.
(i) For any nonnegative matrix M, r(M) = lim sup`→∞ trace
(
M`
)
.
(ii) In particular, if B and B̂ are two nonnegative matrices such that B ≥ B̂, then
r(B) ≥ r(B̂).
For a directed, unweighted adjacency matrix M, the quantity trace
(
M`
)
counts the
number of cycles of length ` in the corresponding network. More generally, for an arbitrary
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matrix M it measures the strength of all cycles of length ` by taking the product of the
edge weights for each such cycle, and then summing these values over all such cycles.15
Thus, by Fact 1, the total value of long cycles provides an asymptotically exact estimate
of the spectral radius.
An immediate implication of Fact 1 is that essential players will be those that are present
in sufficiently many of the high value cycles in the network, regardless of the specific
marginal benefits they receive and provide. Ballester, Calvo´-Armengol, and Zenou (2006)
pose a similar question to ours. They consider a setting where agents can privately benefit
from taking positive effort and players simultaneously choose how much effort to exert.
Studying the Nash equilibrium of this game, they define the key players as those who’s
removal results in the largest decrease in aggregate effort. In Appendix E we provide an
example in which their key player and our essential player differ.16 Loosely, the essential
player is the player present in many strong cycles of marginal benefits (measured by first
derivatives of payoffs), while the key player is the player who’s effort is most directly and
indirectly complementary to others’ (measured by cross-partials of payoffs).
The connection between the spectral radius and cycles also suggests when there will be
greater scope for cooperation. A single weak link in a cycle will dramatically reduce the
value of that cycle. Thus networks with an imbalanced structure, in which it is rare for
those agents who could confer large marginal benefits on others to be the beneficiaries of
others’ efforts, will have a lower spectral radius and there will be less scope for cooperation.
4. Lindahl Outcomes
In this section, we focus attention on a particular class of Pareto efficient solutions. The
insight behind the Lindahl solution is that a public good would be provided efficiently
if each agent could be made to face a personalized price equal to his marginal benefit
from the good. This would allow contributions to be collected up to the point where
the marginal social benefit of providing the public good equals its marginal social cost.
This point was initially made in simple environments, but Arrow (1969) shows that,
quite generally, externalities—whatever their incidence—can be reinterpreted as missing
markets. Following Lindahl and Arrow, we augment our setting by adding the missing
markets and look for a Walrasian equilibrium of the augmented economy. We refer to
these outcomes as Lindahl outcomes. The prices in the markets that are introduced
are personalized taxes and subsidies: Each agent pays a personalized tax for every unit
of each other agent’s effort he enjoys, and receives a personalized subsidy (financed by
others’ taxes) per unit of effort he exerts.17 These prices are not subject to the normal
equilibrating forces that operate in competitive markets (Samuelson, 1954). In Section
15More formally, a (directed) cycle of length ` in the matrix M is a sequence (c(1), c(2), . . . , c(`), c(`+ 1))
of elements of N (players), so that: the cycle starts and ends at the same node (c(` + 1) = c(1)); and
Mc(t)c(t+1) > 0 for each t ∈ {1, . . . , `}. Let C(`;M) be the set of all cycles of length ` in matrix M. For
any nonnegative matrix M, trace
(
M`
)
=
∑
c∈C(`;M)
∏`
t=1Mc(t)c(t+1).
16Section 5.2 discusses the details of endogenizing the Nash status quo, which permits studying its com-
parative statics simultaneously with those of our efficient solution in the same model.
17There need not be any transferable private commodity in which these prices are denominated. We can
think of each player having access to artificial tokens, facing prices for the public goods denominated in
these tokens, and being able to choose any outcome subject to not using more tokens than he receives
from others.
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4.2, we review game-theoretic microfoundations for the Lindahl concept in our setting,
explaining what sorts of negotiations can lead to Lindahl outcomes.
To construct the augmented economy, let P be an n-by-n matrix of prices, with Pij (for
i 6= j) being the price i pays to j per unit of j’s effort. Let Qij be how much i purchases of
j’s effort at this price. The total expenditure of i on other agents’ efforts is
∑
j PijQij and
the total income that i receives from other agents is
∑
j PjiQji. Market-clearing requires
that all agents i 6= j demand exactly the same effort from agent j, and so Qij = aj for all
i and all j 6= i. Incorporating these market clearing conditions, agent i faces the budget
constraint
(BBi(P))
∑
j:j 6=i
Pijaj ≤ ai
∑
j:j 6=i
Pji.
The Lindahl solution requires that, subject to market-clearing and budget constraints,
the outcome is each agent’s most preferred action profile among those he can afford. We
therefore have the following definition:
Definition 1. An action profile a∗ is a Lindahl outcome for a preference profile u if
there are prices P so that the following conditions hold for every i:
(i) BBi(P) is satisfied when a = a
∗;
(ii) for any a such that the inequality BBi(P) is satisfied, we have ui(a
∗) ≥ ui(a).
Hatfield et al. (2013) consider the problem of agents located on a network trading
bilateral contracts. The augmented economy we have constructed can be mapped into
their very general domain. They show that with quasi-linear utilities and under a con-
dition of “full substitutability,” stable outcomes exist and are essentially equivalent to
the competitive equilibrium outcomes. It might be hoped that we can make use of their
results. Unfortunately we cannot. Their full substitutability condition is violated by our
augmented economy. Intuitively, the opportunities for agent i to be compensated for his
effort by agents j and k are complementary—agent i only needs to exert effort once to be
compensated by both j and k.
The main result in this section, Theorem 1, relates agents’ contributions in Lindahl
outcomes to how “central” they are in the network of externalities.
Definition 2. An action profile a ∈ Rn+ has the centrality property (or is a centrality
action profile) if a 6= 0 and B(a)a = a.
According to this condition a is a right-hand eigenvector of B(a) with eigenvalue 1.
Because actions are nonnegative, the Perron–Frobenius Theorem implies that such an a
is the Perron, or principal, eigenvector—the one associated to the largest eigenvalue of
the matrix.18 Section 1 provided some background on this notion of centrality.
Theorem 1. The following are equivalent for a nonzero a ∈ Rn+:
(i) B(a)a = a, i.e., a has the centrality property;
(ii) a is a Lindahl outcome.
18We discussed in Section 3.1 that the set of Pareto efficient action profiles is invariant to rescaling the
utility functions, because such rescalings do not affect the benefits matrix. The same argument implies
that the centrality action profiles are also invariant to such rescalings.
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We can also establish that any nonzero Lindahl outcome is interior (Lemma 2, Appendix
C). An outline of the proof of Theorem 1 is below and the complete proof appears in
Appendix C. However, before presenting the argument, it is worth remarking on some
simple consequences of Theorem 1. First, at any interior Lindahl outcome a, the matrix
B(a) has a nonnegative right eigenvector a with eigenvalue 1, and therefore, by the
Perron–Frobenius Theorem, a spectral radius of 1. Proposition 1 then implies the Pareto
efficiency of a, providing an alternative proof of the First Welfare Theorem.19
Second, the condition B(a)a = a is a system of n equations in n unknowns (the
coordinates of a). By a standard argument (see, e.g., Shannon, 2008), this entails that
for generic utility functions satisfying our assumptions, the set of solutions will be of
dimension 0 in Rn+. Therefore, the set of Lindahl outcomes is typically “small,” as is
usually the case with sets of market equilibria.
Finally, the equivalence between Lindahl outcomes and centrality action profiles allows
us to establish the existence of a Lindahl equilibrium in our setting, where standard proofs
do not go through because of their boundedness requirements:
Proposition 2. Either a = 0 is Pareto efficient or there is a centrality action profile in
which all actions are strictly positive.
The proof of Proposition 2 is in Appendix C. We also show that the profile 0 is a
Lindahl outcome if and only if it is Pareto efficient (Proposition 7 in Section D).
4.1. An Outline of the Proof of Theorem 1. It will be convenient to introduce
scaling-indifferent action profiles. From the definition of the benefits matrix, scaling-
indifference is easily verified to be equivalent to the centrality property, and we will use
the two notions interchangeably. Recall that J(a) is the Jacobian, with entry (i, j) equal
to Jij(a) = ∂ui(a)/∂aj.
Definition 3. An action profile a ∈ Rn+ satisfies scaling-indifference20 (or is scaling-
indifferent) if a 6= 0 and J(a)a = 0.
We will show that a profile is a Lindahl outcome if and only if it has the centrality
property. The more difficult part is the “if” part. The key fact is that the system of
equations B(a∗)a∗ = a∗ allows us to extract Pareto weights that support the outcome
a∗ as efficient, and using those Pareto weights and the Jacobian, we can construct prices
that support a∗ as a Lindahl outcome.
Now in more detail: Suppose we have a nonzero a∗ so that B(a∗)a∗ = a∗. As we noted
in the previous subsection, the profile a∗ is then interior and Pareto efficient.21 It follows
by a standard fact that there are Pareto weights θ ∈ R+ \ {0} such that a∗ maximizes∑
i θiui(a) over all a ∈ Rn+.
19A standard proof can be found in, e.g., Foley (1970).
20To see the reason for the name, note that, to a first-order approximation, u(a+ εv) ≈ u(a) + εJ(a)v.
Suppose now that actions a are scaled by 1 + ε, for some small real number ε; this corresponds to setting
v = a. If J(a)a = 0, then all players are indifferent, in the first-order sense, to this small proportional
perturbation in everyone’s actions.
21This is the point where the Perron–Frobenius Theorem plays a key role—recall the discussion that
follows Proposition 1(i).
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Let us normalize utility functions so that Jii(a
∗) = −1. We will guess Lindahl prices
Pij = θiJij(a
∗) for i 6= j.
For notational convenience, we also define a quantity Pii = θiJii(a).
To show that at these prices, actions a∗ are a Lindahl outcome, two conditions must
hold. The first is the budget-balance condition, replicated below for convenience:
(BBi(P))
∑
j:j 6=i
Pija
∗
j − a∗i
∑
j:j 6=i
Pji ≤ 0.
Second, agents must be choosing optimal action levels subject to their budget constraints,
given the prices.
First, we will show that at the prices we’ve guessed, equation BBi(P) holds with equality
and so each agent is exhausting his budget:
(4)
∑
j:j 6=i
Pija
∗
j − a∗i
∑
j:j 6=i
Pji = 0.
To this end, first note that a∗ maximizes
∑
i θiui(a), implying the first-order conditions∑
i∈N
θiJij(a
∗) = 0 ⇔
∑
j: j 6=i
Pij = −Pii,
where the rewriting on the right is from our definition of the Pij. Now, the equation (4)
that we would like to establish becomes
∑
j:j 6=i Pija
∗
j + a
∗
iPii = 0 or Pa
∗ = 0. Because
row i of P is a scaling of row i of J(a∗), this is equivalent to J(a∗)a∗ = 0. So a∗ is a
scaling-indifferent action profile and thus, as argued above, a centrality action profile.
It remains only to see that each agent is optimizing at prices P. The essential reason
for this is that price ratios are equal to marginal rates of substitution by construction.
Indeed, when all the denominators involved are nonzero, we may write:
(5)
Pij
Pik
=
θiJij(a
∗)
θiJik(a∗)
=
Jij(a
∗)
Jik(a∗)
.
Since Pii is minus the income that agent i receives per unit of action, this checks that
each agent is making an optimal effort-supply decision, in addition to trading off all other
goods optimally.
Consider now the converse implication—that if a∗ is a nonzero Lindahl outcome, then
J(a∗)a∗ = 0. A nonzero Lindahl outcome a∗ can be shown to be interior. (This is Lemma
2 in Appendix C.) Given this, and that agents are optimizing given prices, we have
Pij
Pik
=
Jij(a
∗)
Jik(a∗)
,
which echoes (5) above. In other words, each row of P is a scaling of the same row of
J(a∗). Therefore, the condition that each agent is exhausting his budget,22 which can be
succinctly written as Pa∗ = 0, implies that J(a∗)a∗ = 0.
22This follows because each agent is optimizing given prices, and by Assumption 3 there is always some
contribution each agent wishes to purchase.
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For intuition, we offer a brief comment on the form of the prices. The prices we guessed
were Pij = θiJij(a
∗). This entails that, all else equal, an agent pays a higher price if
his Pareto weight is greater and if he values the good in question more (relative to his
own marginal cost of providing effort—remembering that we have normalized here so that
Jii(a
∗) = −1). What is the reason for prices to have this form?
For agent i to be optimizing, he must be maximizing ui(a) subject to the budget
constraint BBi(P) and, by the first-order conditions, µiPij = Jij(a
∗), where µi is the
Lagrange multiplier on the constraint BBi(P)—i.e., the marginal utility of relaxing the
constraint BBi(P), or the marginal utility of income to i. Next, consider the planner
who puts weight θi on player i. At a solution to this planner’s problem it must be that
µiθi is the same across agents and thus a constant—otherwise the planner would want to
increase the actions of some agents and reduce the actions of others. Combining these two
observations we deduce that Pij is directly proportional to θiJij(a
∗), and as only relative
prices matter we can set Pij = θiJij(a
∗), which is the guess we made above.23
4.2. A Review of Foundations for the Lindahl Solution. We introduced the Lin-
dahl solution as a conceptual device for emulating missing markets for externalities, but
deferred discussion of how it can be implemented in actual negotiations over public goods.
In this section, we review several foundations for the Lindahl solution—combinations of
normative and strategic properties implying it. In view of Theorem 1, these results are
equivalently foundations for the class of centrality action profiles. Our discussions here
adapt existing results, and so we describe the essence of each foundation briefly, referring
to the prior literature. In each case, we have to adjust previous arguments to work in our
setting with unbounded action spaces. Sections 3, 4, and 5 of the Online Appendix are
devoted to precise statements.
4.2.1. A Group Bargaining Game. We consider a bargaining game related to those stud-
ied by Da´vila, Eeckhout, and Martinelli (2009) and Penta (2011). These papers are
part of a broader literature that seeks multilateral bargaining foundations for Walrasian
outcomes.24
In the game, agents go around a table, and each agent can make a proposal about the
ratios in which individuals should contribute. A typical proposal says, “For every unit
done by me, I demand that agent 1 contribute 3 units, agent 2 contribute 0.5 units,” and
so on. Following this, each agent simultaneously replies whether he vetoes the proposal,
and if not, how many units he is willing to contribute at most. Assuming no vetos,
the maximum contributions are implemented consistent with the announced ratios and
everyone’s caps. If someone vetoes, a period of delay occurs and the next proposer gets
to speak. Until an agreement is reached, players receive the payoff of the status quo
outcome, and they discount at rate δ > 0 per period.
The result is that the only Pareto efficient equilibrium outcomes involve immediate
agreement on a centrality action profile. Thus, in a natural multilateral generalization
of sequential bargaining, equilibrium play along with the requirement of efficiency selects
the Lindahl outcome. The details are in Section 3 of the Online Appendix.
23We thank Phil Reny for this insight.
24See also Yildiz (2003) and Da´vila and Eeckhout (2008).
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4.2.2. Implementation Theory: The Lindahl Outcome as a Robust Selection. An alter-
native approach, based on implementation theory, places a more stringent normative
requirement on the game—requiring all equilibria to yield efficient improvements on the
status quo. It will turn out that Lindahl outcomes play a distinguished role from this
perspective as well. Again we sketch the result, relegating the formal treatment to Section
4 of the Online Appendix.25
A designer specifies a mechanism—message spaces for all the agents and an (enforce-
able) outcome function that maps messages into action profiles a ∈ Rn. The designer
assumes that the profile of players’ preferences, u = (u1, u2, . . . , un), comes from some
particular set U , but she does not know exactly which preferences they will have in this
set. She also assumes that players will end up playing a complete information Nash equi-
librium of her game, but she has no control over which equilibrium. We look for games
the designer can create in which, for all preference profiles, all Nash equilibria satisfy
Pareto efficiency and individual rationality. Pareto efficiency requires that any action
profile resulting from equilibrium play of the game is Pareto efficient. Individual ratio-
nality ensures that every player is no worse off than at the status quo. We also require
that equilibrium outcomes depend continuously on agents preferences: arbitrarily small
changes in preferences cannot force large changes in the equilibrium set.
It turns out that there are certain outcomes that occur as equilibrium outcomes for
every mechanism satisfying the desiderata we have outlined above. This set of outcomes
is called the set of robustly attainable outcomes. And the argument in favor of the Lindahl
selection is the fact that, under suitable assumptions, this set is exactly equal to the set
of Lindahl outcomes.
More precisely, the result is: Assume U consists of all profiles the assumptions of Section
2.2, and the number of players n is at least 3. Then the robustly attainable outcomes are
the Lindahl outcomes.
To see why this result is useful, suppose multiplicity of equilibria is considered a draw-
back of a mechanism—perhaps because this renders it less effective at coordinating the
players on one efficient outcome. In that case, mechanisms implementing just the central-
ity action profiles do the best job of avoiding multiplicity. Such mechanisms exist exactly
when there is a unique centrality action profile. In those cases, that is the outcome
implemented.
4.2.3. Coalitional Deviations: A Core Property. As we are modeling negotiations, a nat-
ural question is whether some subset of the agents could do better by breaking up the
negotiations and coming to some other agreement among themselves. Although this is
outside the scope of actions available to the agents as modeled, the Lindahl outcomes
are robust to coalitional deviations, if we assume that following a deviation, negotiations
collapse and the non-deviating players choose their individually optimal responses, which
are the status quo actions.26 In our setting, this also minimizes the payoffs of any group
of deviating players, taking the deviators’ actions as given. Thus, the response by the
25Our result is analogous to Theorem 3 of Hurwicz (1979a). Because the environment studied in that
paper—with assumptions such as nonzero endowments of all private goods—is not readily adapted to
our problem, we prove the result separately, using Hurwicz’s insights combined with Maskin’s Theorem.
26For any actions agents other than i can take, holding constant these actions a−i, agent i’s payoff is
maximized by i selecting ai = 0.
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complementary coalition is both individually optimal for the punishers, and maximally
harsh to the punished. We consider an outcome robust to coalitional deviations if no
coalition would like to deviate, anticipating such a punishment.
Then we have the following result: If a ∈ Rn+ has the centrality property, then a
is robust to coalitional deviations in the sense just described. This result is presented
formally in Section 5 of the Online Appendix
The remarkable yet simple argument for this, due to Shapley and Shubik (1969) is
that the standard core of the artificial economy we presented earlier (with tradeable ex-
ternalities) can be identified with the set of action profiles that are robust to coalitional
deviations in our setting. In defining the core of the economy with tradeable externalities,
we think of a deviating coalition ceasing trade with players outside of it. When exter-
nalities are not tradeable, we define outcomes robust to coalitional deviations by positing
that a deviating coalition is punished by players outside the coalition reverting to the zero
action level, i.e., the action level at which the deviating coalition receives no benefits from
the rest of society. Both coalitional deviations yield the same payoffs, so the same action
profiles are robust to coalitional deviations in both settings.
4.2.4. A General Comment on Commitment and Information. The foundations for Lin-
dahl outcomes that we have presented in this section have two key features: (i) commit-
ment over actions; (ii) complete information among the negotiating agents.
The assumption of commitment is standard in mechanism design, and in our case crucial
for overcoming the free-riding problem. Some amount of commitment is necessary to
contemplate efficient solutions—whether that commitment is credible due to the incentives
created by repeated interaction, or modeled via exogenous rules of the game, as in Sections
4.2.1 and 4.2.2. How much enforcement is possible in particular public goods problems
is a critical question. Our contribution is to examine, in the benchmark case where there
is commitment, how the network of externalities affects an important class of efficient
solutions.
In terms of information, we assume that while the designer of the game or mechanism
may be ignorant of everything but the basic structure of the environment, the players in-
teract in an environment of complete information about each other’s preferences. Indeed,
when transferable utility is not assumed—i.e., when Vickrey–Clarke–Groves pivot mech-
anisms are not available—mechanism design with interim uncertainty in environments
such as ours is not well-understood.27 Versions of our model with asymmetric informa-
tion are certainly worth studying. We would expect the connections we identify between
favor-trading games and networks to be relevant for that analysis.
5. Applications
In this section we present four applications of our general results. First, we show how
the above analysis can be used to predict who will be admitted to a team. Second, we
extend the framework to endogenize the status quo, making it a Nash equilibrium of a
unilateral-contribution game; this enriches the comparative statics of the problem, since
now both the status quo and Lindahl outcomes move around with the environment. Third,
we use special cases of our results to provide market interpretations of several measures of
27See, e.g., Garratt and Pycia (2015) for recent work.
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network centrality that have been utilized in a variety of settings, both within economics
and especially in other fields. Finally, we study when a negotiating group or a team may
be subdivided without much loss in terms of the outcome they reach. For some of these
discussions, it will be helpful to think about eigenvector centralities in terms of walks on
the network, so we begin with a discussion of that.
In Section 3.2, we saw that the spectral radius of the benefits matrix could be interpreted
through the values of long cycles. A related interpretation applies to centrality action
profiles. A walk of length ` in the matrix M is a sequence (w(1), w(2), . . . , w(` + 1)) of
elements of N (player indices) such that Mw(t)w(t+1) > 0 for each t ∈ {1, 2, . . . , `}.28 Let
W↓i (`; M) be the set of all walks of length ` in M ending at i (in our notation, such that
w(` + 1) = i). For a non-negative matrix M, define the value of a walk w of length ` as
the product of all matrix entries (i.e., link weights) along the walk:
v(w; M) =
∏`
t=1
Mw(t)w(t+1).
Note that such walks can repeat nodes—for example, they may cover the same cycle many
times. Then we have the following:
Proposition 3. Let M = B(a)T and assume this matrix is aperiodic.29 Then a has the
centrality property if and only if, for every i and j,
ai
aj
= lim
`→∞
∑
w∈W↓i (`;M)
v(w; M)
∑
w∈W↓j (`;M)
v(w; M)
.
A walk in B(a)T ending at i can be thought of as a chain of benefit flows: e.g., k helps
j, who helps i. The value of such a walk is the product of the marginal benefits along
its links. According to Proposition 3, at a centrality action profile (and hence a Lindahl
outcome) a player contributes in proportion to the total value of such benefit chains that
end with him.30
An implication of this analysis is that if the benefits i receives from j decrease at all
action profiles, i.e., Bij(a) decreases for all a, then i’s centrality action level relative to all
other agents will decrease. Thus, it is the benefits i receives, rather than the benefits i
confers on others, which really matter for i’s eigenvector centrality. If, for example, there
is an agent who can very efficiently provide benefits to the other agents, and centrality
action profiles are played, then there can be high returns from increasing the marginal
28As with cycles, defined in Section 3.2, nodes can be repeated in this sequence. Note also that a cycle
is a special kind of walk.
29A simple cycle is one that has no repeated nodes except the initial/final one. A matrix is said to be
aperiodic if the greatest common divisor of the lengths of all simple cycles in that matrix is 1.
30The formula of the proposition would also hold if had we defined M = B(a) and replaced W↓i (`;M)
by W↑i (`;M), which is the set of walks of length ` in M that start at i. The convention we use above
is in keeping with thinking of a walk in B(a)T capturing the direction in which benefits flow; recall the
discussion in Section 3.2.
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benefits that this agent receives from others (and particularly those others with high
eigenvector centrality). This has important implications, which we now discuss.
5.1. Application: Admitting a New Team Member. Suppose agents N = {1, 2, 3}
currently constitute a team. These initial team members must decide whom, if anyone, to
admit as a new member of their team. They have four options: admit nobody or admit
a new team member j ∈ M = {4, 5, 6}. Afterward, the formed team collectively decides
how much effort each of them should exert. We assume that these negotiations result in
the Lindahl actions being played (see Section 4.2.1 for a motivation).
Who can provide benefits to whom in the initial team is described by the unweighted,
directed graph G (with entries in {0, 1}), illustrated in Figure 3a. Once the decision
about team composition has been made, Gij is set to 0 if either i or j is not on the team.
We assume that the original team members N can provide relatively strong benefits to
each other and to the new team members M , but that the new team member M are only
able to provide weaker benefits. Specifically, the utility function of i is:
ui(a) =
∑
j∈N
Gij log(1 + aj) +
∑
j∈M
Gij
4
log(1 + aj)− ai.
Agents not on the team will choose to exert no effort31 and will receive a payoff of 0.
Figure 3b illustrates all possible benefit flows. Whom, if anyone, should the initial team
members admit? Will the initial team members be able to agree on whom to admit?
A quick inspection of Figure 3 suggests that each original team member might most
prefer admitting a new team member that can work with him directly. However, it is
also worth noting that 3 is the only member of the original team that provides benefits to
both of the other orginal team members. Increasing the effort of 3 is, in some sense, more
efficient than increasing the effort of 1 or 2. Moreover, recall that as the Lindahl actions
will be taken after the admission decision is made, those who receive higher marginal
benefits will make more effort (by Theorem 1 and the discussion at the start of this
section). Perhaps then it might be relatively efficient to admit 6, the potential “helper”
of 3, to induce 3 to take the highest possible action? In turns out that in this case, and
this increased efficiency exceeds the direct benefits 1 or 2 can receive from admitting 4 or
5, respectively, helping to align all the initial team members’ interests.
3
1
2
(a)
3
1
2
4
5 6
(b)
Figure 3. Panel A shows the original negotiators and who among them
can benefit whom. Panel B shows the benefits accruing to and coming from
potential additional negotiators.
31For such an agent i, ui(a) = −ai.
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We now formalize this intuition using the tools we have developed. By Theorem 1,
agents’ Lindahl actions are given by their centralities. Applying the scaling-indifference
characterization of these actions, J(a)a = 0, we find that the centrality action of agent
i is characterized by ai =
∑
j(Gijaj)/(1 + aj). The unique
32 centrality actions if no new
team members are admitted are a; if 4 is admitted they are a′; if 5 is instead added they
are a′′; and if 6 is added they are a′′′, where in each vector the last entry corresponds to
the action taken by the new team member:
a =

.408
.225
.290
−
 a′ =

.523
.256
.343
.343
 a′′ =

.462
.286
.316
.222
 a′′′ =

.497
.279
.386
.279
 .
If added, 4 will take a higher action than 6 who will take a higher action than 5.
However, the inclusion of 6 induces agent 3 to take the highest action, providing indirect
benefits to both 1 and 2. The utility vectors for the original negotiators, when the
centrality action profiles are played, are shown below for the options of admitting nobody,
admitting 4, admitting 5 and admitting 6:
u(a) =
 .049.030
.052
 u(a′) =
 .074.040
.077
 u(a′′) =
 .064.039
.064
 u(a′′′) =
 .076.048
.078
 .
Thus, the incentives of the core negotiators are perfectly aligned. Even though different
potential additions benefit different original team members, all prefer admitting 6 to
admitting 4 to admitting 5 to admitting nobody. The indirect benefit flows from admitting
agent 6 outweigh the direct benefit flows agents 1 and 2 would receive from admitting
agent 4 or 5.
While in general the incentives of agents will not be aligned when deciding whom
to include in a team, studying the network structure of the externalities can help us
understand the implications of including different team members. One general lesson is
that team members who have the potential to provide benefits to many others realize this
potential when they are the beneficiaries of links from new members.
5.2. Endogenous Status Quo. In the main analysis, we made assumptions so that the
Nash equilibrium action profile was 0 (the corner of the nonnegative orthant, in which
actions lie), and argued that this was essentially a normalization. While convenient for
some purposes, it is not suited for others, such as studying the difference between Nash
and Lindahl outcomes when changes in the environment cause both to change. In this
section, we endogenize the status quo, making it the Nash equilibrium of a simultaneous-
move public goods contribution game. To this end, suppose Assumptions 2 (positive
externalities), 3 (irreducibility) and 4 (bounded improvements) continue to hold, but we
relax Assumption 1 (costly actions). Consider now a simultaneous-move game in which
each agent chooses an action ai ∈ R+.
Consider a Nash equilibrium action profile aNE, defined by the condition that aNEi =
argmaxai ui(ai, a
NE
−i ). By the concavity of the utility functions, for all i, we have
∂ui
∂ai
(aNE) ≤
32Uniqueness is established by first noting that each agent’s preferences satisfy the gross substitutes
property, and therefore the Lindahl outcome is unique (McKenzie, 1959).
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0, with equality holding if aNEi > 0. Take the actions a
NE as the status quo. For any a,
define â := a−aNE to be the increment of a given action profile over the Nash equilibrium
action profile. Also define the utility profile û(â) := u(aNE + â). With the action space
and utility profiles reparameterized in this way, the status quo action profile â = 0 is the
Nash equilibrium action profile, and ∂ûi(0)
∂âi
≤ 0 for all i. The assumption â ≥ 0, which
is maintained for our analysis, entails that players do not take actions below their Nash
equilibrium actions.33
There are then two cases to consider. If ∂ûi
∂âi
(0) < 0 for all i (Case I), then Assumptions 1,
2, 3 and 4 all hold for the environment given by û, and our results go through unchanged.
If ∂ûi
∂âi
(0) = 0 for some i (Case II), then Assumption 1 will be violated. This prevents us
from directly applying our results. However, this is a technical rather than substantive
problem, as we show now. Indeed, in Case II, the proofs of Proposition 1 and Theorem 1
go through with some modification.
For Proposition 1, to show that Pareto efficiency of an interior a∗ implies B(a∗; û) has
spectral radius 1, we can again start by looking at the first-order condition θJ(a∗; û) = 0,
for some nonzero θ ∈ R+. We cannot immediately divide each row of this equation by
−Jii(a∗; û) = −∂ûi∂ai (a∗; û) to convert this into θB(a∗; û) = θ, because that might involve
dividing by 0. So first we argue that a∗ satisfying the first-order condition must have
Jii(a
∗; û) < 0 for every i. This is precisely the content of the following lemma, whose
proof is deferred to Appendix C.
Lemma 1. Take any utility profile û satisfying Assumptions 2 and 3, with ∂ûi
∂âi
(â; û) ≤ 0
for every i and every â. If the first-order condition θJ(a∗; û) = 0 holds for a nonzero
vector of Pareto weights, θ ∈ R+, then Jii(a∗; û) < 0 for every i.
With this lemma in hand, the proof of Proposition 1 can continue as before. The
intuition for the lemma is simple: for any a we can construct a new u˜ so that Jii(â; u˜) is
negative but very small whenever it was zero under û, and J(â; û) is unchanged otherwise.
Now B(â; u˜) is irreducible, and thus contains cycles; by making the cost we’ve introduced
sufficiently small, we can make the value of these cycles very large which, as shown in
section 3.2, creates a Pareto improvement, guaranteeing that â is not an efficient point
under u˜. It is therefore not efficient under û, either.
The following corollary shows that interior (non-zero) Nash equilibrium action profiles
are inefficient.
Corollary 1. The Nash equilibrium action profile is Pareto efficient only if it is the
zero action profile.
Proof. Suppose there is a Nash equilibrium action profile (before parametrization) aNE so
that aNEi > 0 for some i. Then Jii(a
NE; u) = Jii(0; û) = 0. So by Lemma 1, a
NE cannot
solve the Pareto problem. 
When the Nash equilibrium action profile is zero, every agent might be up against the
lower bound in their action profile and prefer to take lower actions that are unavailable.
This could occur if actions correspond to irreversible investments (perhaps sunk invest-
ments in clean energy), a Nash equilibrium is played, and then some parameter of the
33This restriction makes sense when investments are irreversible, though our main results would have
analogues without it.
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environment changes causing the Nash equilibrium actions to decrease. Then, even though
the positive benefits of higher actions are neglected in the private decision of how much
effort to exert, the zero action can be Pareto efficient. The positive marginal benefits that
would accrue to others may not cover the private marginal costs of higher actions.
Like Proposition 1, Theorem 1 extends to the case in which the status quo actions are
a Nash equilibrium. Indeed, the existing proofs go through, using the newly strengthened
Proposition 1 we’ve just discussed.
Having handled the technical issues in defining our solution with a general Nash equi-
librium status quo, we can draw on public goods and networks literature pioneered by
Ballester, Calvo´-Armengol and Zenou (2006) to characterize the Nash equilibrium status
quo and compare it to the Lindahl action profile. However, to use results from this litera-
ture, it will be convenient to look at a special case of our setting. Let G be an undirected,
unweighted graph (gij = gji ∈ {0, 1}), with no self-links (gii = 0), describing which agents
are neighbors. For a matrix M we let
λmin(M) := min{|λ| : λ is an eigenvalue of M}.
Suppose utility functions are given by
ui(a) = b
(
ai + δ
∑
j
gijaj
)
− ai,
where b is a strictly increasing and convex function and λmin(G) < 1/δ. Note that in this
formulation, an agent’s neighbors’ actions are prefect substitutes for one another.
Proposition 4 (Bramoulle´, Kranton, and D’Amours (2014)). Given the above assump-
tions, there is a unique Nash equilibrium.
To further compare the Nash equilibrium and Lindahl outcomes let G be a regular
graph in which all agents have k links (and continue to assume δ is sufficiently small for
λmin(G) < 1/δ). Let β(x) = b
′(x). The unique Nash equilibrium is then symmetric, with
aNE = aNEi = β
−1(1)/(1 + δk). Given the above utilities, at an action profile where the
benefits matrix is well defined, for i 6= j the ijth entry of the benefits matrix is:
Bij(a) = gij
δβ(ai + δ
∑
j gijaj)
−(β(ai + δ
∑
j gijaj)− 1)
.
We now apply Theorem 1. To maintain the comparison with the Nash equilibrium it is
helpful to decompose actions into their increment over the Nash equilibrium. We therefore
look for Lindahl equilibrium actions aLE = aNE + â. As the Nash equilibrium is the status
quo, Theorem 1 then adjusts so that B(aLE)â = â, or equivalently, B(aLE)
(
aLE − aNE) =(
aLE − aNE). We therefore have that
(aLEi − aNEi ) =
∑
j
gij
δβ(aLEi + δ
∑
j gija
LE
j )
1− β(aLEi + δ
∑
j gija
LE
j )
(aLEj − aNEj ),
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for all i. There is then a Lindahl equilibrium in which all agents take the same action
and34
aLE = aLEi =
β−1
(
1
1+kδ
)
(1 + kδ)
>
β−1(1)
(1 + δk)
= aNEi = a
NE.
The Nash equilibrium actions are decreasing in k and δ. Intuitively, at higher values
of k and δ there is more free riding on the actions of other agents and agents choose
lower actions in equilibrium. Interestingly, even though the increased externalities are
internalised in the Lindahl equilibrium, the Lindahl actions are not always increasing
in the level of externalities δ.35 For example, when b(·) = log(·), the Lindahl actions are
invariant with respect to δ (and k). The intuition underlying this is that when the benefits
function is sufficiently concave increasing δ at the current Lindahl equilibrium increases
the agents’ consumption of the public goods, causing the marginal benefits from further
consumption to decrease sufficiently that in the Lindahl equilibrium agents reduce their
actions. Nevertheless, the presence of free-riding in the Nash equilibrium is comparison
to the Lindahl equilibrium is observable when comparing the Lindahl and Nash actions.
The ratio of the Lindahl to Nash actions is increasing in k, δ and the concavity of the b.36
It is clear from the calculations that regularity played an essential role in this example.
To examine the same questions without imposing regularity, in Appendix 7, we consider
a star graph, such that one center agent is connected to all other agents who have only
this link. Setting b(·) = log(·), a specification under which any regular graph has Lindahl
actions invariant in the level of externalities δ, we find that that the center agent’s Lindahl
action decreases in δ, while the periphery agents’ Lindahl actions are increasing in δ. The
ratio of the Lindahl to Nash actions, as with regular graphs, is increasing in δ.
5.3. Explicit Formulas for Lindahl Outcomes. Several measures of network central-
ity have been extensively employed in the networks literature. In this section we use our
results to provide new foundations for three of them. We do so by linking each measure
to the Lindahl equilibrium under different parametric assumptions on preferences.
The preferences we consider are:
(6) ui(a) = −ai +
∑
j
[αGijaj +Hij log aj] ,
where G and H are nonnegative matrices (networks) with zeros on the diagonal (no self-
links) and α < 1/r(G). Let hi =
∑
j Hij. For any preferences in this family, the centrality
property (a = B(a)a) discussed throughout the paper boils down to a = h + αGa.
34This calculation relies heavily on the symmetry of this problem. It would be interesting to explore
the difference between Lindahl and Nash outcomes more generally, although also harder because the key
quantities will only be implicitly defined.
35Implicitly differentiating the first order condition and rearranging gives
∂aLEi
∂δ
= − k
b′′(a(1 + kδ))(1 + kδ)3
(
1 + ab′′(a(1 + kδ))(1 + kδ)2
)
.
This expression is weakly greater than zero if and only if −b′′(a(1 + kδ)) ≤ 1a(1+kδ)2 .
36As b is concave, β is strictly decreasing so β−1 is well-defined and also strictly decreasing. It follows
that β−1
(
1
1+kδ
)
is increasing in k and δ.
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Several special cases worth considering. If α = 0, then ai = hi and i’s Lindahl action is
equal to the number of i’s neighbors in H. This measure of i’s centrality in the network H
is known as i’s degree centrality. If, instead, hi = 1 for all i, then agents’ Lindahl actions
are a = [I− αG]−1 1. The right-hand side is a different measure of agents’ centralities in
the network G, known as their Bonacich centralities. Like degree centrality, it depends
on the number of i’s neighbors, but also depends on longer-range paths.37 Finally, in
this setting, as α approaches 1, agents’ actions become proportional to their normalized
eigenvector centralities in G. These results are further discussed in Section 8 of the Online
Appendix.
As Lindahl outcomes are defined in terms of prices, the formulas we have presented
may be viewed as microfoundations or interpretations of network centrality measures in
terms of price equilibria. Each result says that for particular preferences, the allocations
defined by Lindahl are equal to centralities according to a corresponding measure. Such
a connection permits a new interpretation of well-known centrality measures, and in par-
ticular new ways of assessing parametric choices made in defining them. For example, the
above discussion shows that in this class of environments, degree centrality tracks Lindahl
outcomes only under a very particular parametrization where the marginal externality of
j on i is inversely proportional to j’s action. Beyond these interpretations of parame-
ters, the connection between centrality measures and prices may permit new analytical
techniques inspired by price equilibria.
5.4. Approximating the Full Benefits of Negotiation with Smaller Groups.
There are often costs of organizing a large multilateral negotiation, and therefore it is
important to know when most of the benefits of negotiating can be achieved by instead
organizing negotiations in smaller groups. Our framework allows us to give a simple
analysis of the costs of subdividing a negotiation.38
We will consider an arbitrary Pareto efficient outcome a∗ that a planner would like to
achieve. We will then suppose that the agents are divided into two subsets, M and M c,
and that a∗ is proposed to each. Then each group can contemplate deviations from a∗
that are Pareto-improving for that group. A group will generally have a Pareto-improving
deviation of reducing efforts relative to a∗, because as a group they pay all the costs of
effort but do not internalize any of the benefits to the complement.39
How cheaply can a planner incentivize agents to stay with the original outcome rather
than deviate? To quantify the cost of such incentives, we will imagine that the social
planner can subsidize individuals’ effort, and we will ask when only a small amount of
subsidy will be required to remove any incentive for each group to move away from the
target efficient point a∗.
37It can also be characterized via the equation a = αGa + 1, which resembles the condition defining
eigenvector centrality. For more background and discussion, see Ballester, Calvo´-Armengol, and Zenou
(2006, Section 3) and (Jackson, 2008, Section 2.2.4).
38We are grateful to an anonymous referee for suggesting this analysis.
39To prove this formally, one can use a strict version of Fact 1(ii) to show that the benefits matrix
restricted to just one group has a largest eigenvalue strictly less than 1 (assuming that the benefits
matrix among the grand coalition was irreducible), and then use Proposition 6 in Appendix B to show
that some reduction of all actions yields a Pareto improvement.
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To that end, we will set Jii(a) = −1 for each i and all a, and we will moreover assume
that there is a numeraire in which each agent could be paid—one that enters his utility
additiviely. We will not allow transfers among the agents, but we will allow a planner
to use transfers of this numeraire (potentially required to be “small” in some sense) to
subsidize individuals’ efforts. Thus, we posit that the planner can modify the environment
to one with payoff functions
u˜i(a) = ui(a) +mi(a),
where mi(a) must be nonnegative. We say the profile (mi)i∈N deters deviations from a∗
if the restriction of a∗ to M is Pareto efficient for the population M with preferences
(u˜i(a))i∈N , and if the analogous statement holds for M c. We care about bounding the
cost of separation cM(a
∗), defined as the infimum of
∑
i∈N mi(a
∗)—payments made by the
planner at the implemented outcome—taken over all profiles (mi)i∈N that deter deviations
from a∗.
Proposition 5. Consider a Pareto efficient outcome a∗, and let θ be the corresponding
Pareto weights. Then
cM(a
∗) ≤
∑ θi
θj
Bij(a
∗)a∗j ,
where the summation is taken over all ordered pairs (i, j) such that one element is in M
and the other is in M c.
In graph theory terms, this is the weight of the cut M in a weighted graph derived from
B(a∗), whose edge weights are Wij = θiθjBij(a
∗)a∗j . Holding a
∗ and θ fixed, the bound
in the proposition becomes small when the network given by B(a∗) has only small total
weight on links across groups. Note that it is the properties of marginal benefits that
are key—given this result, a negotiation can be very efficiently separable even when the
separated groups provide large total (i.e., inframarginal) benefits to each other.
The question of when one can find a split with this property is discussed in a large
literature in applied mathematics. One conclusion is that if there is an eigenvalue of
B(a∗) near its largest eigenvalue (1 in this case, since a∗ is efficient) then such a split
exists (Hartfiel and Meyer, 1998).40 (The difference between the largest and eigenvalues
is often referred to as the spectral gap.) Thus, eigenvalues of B(a∗) other than the largest
have economic implications in our setting.
6. Concluding Discussion
In this section we discuss the extent to which some of our more economically restrictive
assumptions can be relaxed, elaborate on how our work fits into several related literatures,
and offer some concluding remarks.
6.1. Relaxing Assumptions. The assumption of a single dimension of effort per agent
is relaxed in Section 1 of the Online Appendix, which introduces a benefits matrix for
each dimension, and characterizes efficient outcomes via the eigenvectors and eigenvalues
of these matrices, and Lindahl outcomes via scaling-indifference. The implicit assumption
of no transfers of a numeraire (“side payments” separate from the actions) is relaxed in
40For a survey of some related results, see Von Luxburg (2007).
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Section 2 of the Online Appendix, where we give the analog of the Samuelson condition
from public finance in our setting.
An important and restrictive assumption we make is that all externalities are positive.
This environment is equivalent to one with negative externalities in which it is costly to
decrease actions. For example, in our simple example in Section 1, the action countries
take can be seen as reducing their pollution by producing less.
The case of both positive and negative externalities is more challenging, and we now
discuss the extent to which Assumption 2 can be relaxed. The key mathematical result
we lean on throughout our analysis is the Perron–Frobenius theorem, which applies only
to non-negative matrices. However, there are generalizations of the theorem in which
the assumption of non-negativity is weakened (see, for example, Johnson and Tarazaga
(2004) and Noutsos (2006)). The weaker assumptions essentially require that the positive
externalities dominate the negative externalities. For example, one sufficient condition is
that all entries of B`(a) are positive for all sufficiently large `, which is related to walks
in the network (see Section 5). We consider the more restrictive environment only for
simplicity.
6.2. Related Literature. A recent literature has found a connection between the Nash
equilibria of one-shot games in networks and centrality measures in those networks. Key
papers in this literature include Ballester, Calvo´-Armengol, and Zenou (2006) on skill
investment with externalities, and Bramoulle´, Kranton, and d’Amours (2014) on local
public goods. Most recently, Allouch (2015) has studied a network version of the setting
introduced by Bergstrom, Blume, and Varian (1986) on the voluntary (static Nash) private
provision of public goods. Generalizing results of Bramoulle´, Kranton, and d’Amours
(2014), he derives comparative statics of public goods provision using network centrality
tools.41 Unlike our approach, results in this literature typically require best responses
to take a particular form.42 Another, more fundamental difference is that the games we
focus on in Section 4.2.1 are designed to overcome the free-riding present in the private
provision models; in contrast, the games studied in the papers mentioned above do not
share this feature and so the Nash equilibria are typically inefficient (see Section 5.2 for
more on this). A recent paper from that literature, perhaps closest to our work insofar
as network centrality is related to prices in a market, is Chen et al. (2015). There, two
firms each offer a different substitutable product to consumers embedded in a network
where consumers’ utilities depend on their neighbors’ consumptions. The firms can price-
discriminate, and using the technology developed by Ballester et al. (2006), equilibrium
prices in this market are tied to agents’ centralities in the network. Key differences remain
insofar as the markets in that paper are not competitive and decisions are unilateral, and
only privately optimal.
In emphasizing the correspondence between centrality and outcomes of a competitive
market, our perspective is related to Du, Lehrer, and Pauzner (2015), who microfound
eigenvector centrality via an exchange economy with Cobb-Douglas preferences. The
parametric forms required to relate outcomes to familiar centrality measures differ in the
41These papers contain more complete discussions of this literature. See also Bramoulle´ and Kranton
(2007).
42For some recent work in which parametric assumptions have been relaxed in the context of network
formation, see Baetz (2015) and Hiller (2013).
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two models, but both papers share the perspective that centrality and markets are closely
related and each concept can be used to shed light on the other. An advantage of the
public goods economy we study is that our characterizations above are a special case of
an eigenvector characterization that applies without parametric assumptions. We believe
these projects taken together offer hope for a fairly rich theory of connections between
market outcomes and network centrality.
Conitzer and Sandholm (2004) study “charity auctions,” which, like the strategic set-
tings we discuss in Section 4.2, are intended to implement Pareto improvements in the
presence of externalities. In that model, agents condition their charitable contributions
on others’ contributions, and so choose action vectors that are reminiscent of the direc-
tions chosen in the bargaining game of Section 4.2.1. A paper taking this approach in a
network context is Ghosh and Mahdian (2008). Their model locates people on a social
network and assumes they benefit linearly from their neighbors’ contributions, with a cap
on how much any individual can contribute. There is an equilibrium of their game that
achieves the maximum possible feasible contributions (subject to individual rationality),
and this involves positive contributions being made if and only if the largest eigenvalue
of the fixed network is greater than one.
Understanding how the presence of externalities affects classical solutions (often ones
inspired by markets) is an active area of research more broadly. For instance, a recent
contribution by Pycia and Yenmez (2016) generalizes classical matching algorithms and
characterizations to settings with both positive and negative externalities.
6.3. Conclusions. Many practical problems, such as preventing harmful climate change,
entail a tragedy of the commons. It is in each agent’s interest to free-ride on the efforts
of others. A question at the heart of economics, and of intense public interest, is the
extent to which negotiations can overcome such problems and lead to outcomes different
from, and better than, the outcomes under static, unilateral decisions. Our thesis is
that, in addressing this problem, it is informative to study the properties of a network of
externalities.
Cycles in this network are necessary for there to be any scope for a Pareto improvement,
and summing these cycles in a certain way identifies whether a Pareto improvement is
possible or not. We can use this insight to identify which agents, or sets of agents, are
essential to a negotiation in the sense that their participation is necessary for achieving a
Pareto improvement on the status quo.
Moreover, a measure of how central agents are in this network—eigenvector centrality—
tells us what actions agents would take under the Lindahl solution. In our environment,
the Lindahl solution is more than just a hypothetical construct describing what we could
expect if missing markets were somehow completed. The Lindahl outcomes correspond to
the efficient equilibria of a bargaining game. Moreover, an implementation-theoretic anal-
ysis selects the Lindahl solutions as ones that are particularly robust to the specification
of the negotiation game.
From the eigenvector centrality characterization of Lindahl outcomes, we can see that
agents’ actions are determined by a weighted sum of the marginal benefits they receive,
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as opposed to the marginal benefits they can provide to others.43 This has implications
for the design of negotiations. If there is an agent who is in a particularly strong position
to provide direct and indirect benefits to others, it will be especially important to include
others in the negotiation who can help this agent. Our results formalize this intuition and
quantify the associated tradeoffs in the formation of a team.
Several interesting questions remain unanswered. Our focus on efficient outcomes re-
quires group cooperation; but if the group can cooperate and commit as a whole, it is
worth worrying about the possibility that a subset of the agents may coordinate on a
deviation from some desired outcome. In Section 4.2.3 we note that Lindahl outcomes are
robust to coalitional deviations assuming that non-deviators revert to no effort, but realis-
tic consequences of a coalition’s reneging are more complex. Are there efficient outcomes
that are robust to deviations even with a richer model of the post-reneging subgame, and
how do such outcomes relate to properties of the benefits network? What incentives are
there for investments that increase the benefits agents can confer on each other? In what
sense does the spectral radius provide an appropriate measure of how much scope for co-
operation there is? In applications such as trade liberalization, where there are multiple
actions available to the different agents, how should negotiations be designed?
43The most explicit version of this statement is in Section 8.3 of the Online Appendix, in which we calcu-
late that the weights of incoming walks according to an exogenous network fully determine equilibrium
efforts.
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Appendix A. The Perron–Frobenius Theorem
The key mathematical tool we use is the Perron–Frobenius Theorem. We state it here
for ease of reference and to enumerate the various parts of it that we rely on at different
points in the paper.44
Theorem (Perron–Frobenius). Let M be an irreducible, square matrix with no negative
entries and spectral radius r(M). Then:
(i) The real number r(M) is an eigenvalue of M.
(ii) There is a vector p (called a Perron vector) with only positive entries such that
Mp = r(M)p.
(iii) If v is a nonzero vector with nonnegative entries such that Mv = qv for some
q ∈ R, then v is a positive scalar multiple of p, and q = r(M).
Note that because a matrix has exactly the same eigenvalues as its transpose, all the
same statements are true, with the same eigenvalue r(M) = r(MT), when we replace M
by its transpose MT. This observation yields a left-hand Perron eigenvector of M, i.e., a
row vector w such that wM = r(M)w. For non-symmetric matrices, it is typically the
case that wT 6= p. The analogue of property (iii) in the theorem holds for w.
44Meyer (2000, Section 8.3) has a comprehensive exposition of this theorem, its proof, and related results.
A NETWORK APPROACH TO PUBLIC GOODS 33
Appendix B. Egalitarian Pareto Improvements
This section serves two purposes. First it presents a result that is of interest in its own
right, clarifying the sense in which the spectral radius of the benefits matrix measures the
magnitude of inefficiency rather than merely diagnosing it. Second, it introduces some
terminology and results that will be useful in subsequent proofs, particularly the proof of
Proposition 2, which establishes the existence of a centrality action profile.
Let ∆n denote the simplex in Rn+ defined by ∆n = {d ∈ Rn+ :
∑
i di = 1}.
Definition 4. The bang for the buck vector b(a,d) at an action profile a along a direction
d ∈ ∆n is defined by
bi(a,d) =
∑
j:j 6=i Jij(a)dj
−Jii(a)di .
This is the ratio
i’s marginal benefit
i’s marginal cost
evaluated at a, when everyone increases actions slightly in the direction d. We say a
direction d ∈ ∆n is egalitarian at a if all the entries of bi(a,d) are equal.
Proposition 6. At any a, there is a unique egalitarian direction deg(a). Every entry of
b(a,deg(a)) is equal to the spectral radius of B(a).
Proposition 6 shows that for any action profile a, there is a unique “egalitarian” direc-
tion in which actions can be changed at a to equalize the marginal benefits per unit of
marginal cost accruing to each agent and that this benefit-to-cost ratio will be equal to
the spectral radius of B(a). Thus, the spectral radius of B(a), when it exceeds 1, can
be thought of as a measure of the size of Pareto improvements available by increasing
actions. (A corresponding interpretation applies when the spectral radius is less than 1.)
Proof. Fix a and denote by r the spectral radius of B(a). Since B(a) is nonnegative
and irreducible, the Perron–Frobenius Theorem guarantees that B(a) has a right-hand
eigenvector d such that
(7) B(a)d = rd.
This is equivalent to b(a,d) = r1, where 1 is the column vector of ones. Therefore, there
is an egalitarian direction that generates a bang for the buck of r (the spectral radius of
B(a)) for everyone.
Now suppose d˜ ∈ ∆n is any egalitarian direction, i.e., for some b we have
b(a, d˜) = b1.
This implies
(8) B(a)d˜ = bd˜.
By the Perron–Frobenius Theorem (statement (iii)), the only real number b and vector
d˜ ∈ ∆n satisfying (8) are b = r and d˜ = d.
Thus, deg(a) = d has all the properties claimed in the proposition’s statement. 
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Appendix C. Omitted Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1:
We first prove part (i). For any nonzero θ ∈ Rn+, define P(θ), the Pareto problem with
Pareto weights θ, as:
maximize
∑
i∈N
θiui(a) subject to a ∈ Rn+.
Suppose that an interior action profile a∗ is Pareto efficient. Assumption 1 guarantees
that Jii(a
∗) is strictly negative. We may multiply utility functions by positive constants
to achieve the normalization Jii(a
∗) = −1 for each i. This is without loss of generality:
It clearly does not affect Pareto efficiency, and it easy to see that scaling utility functions
does not affect B(a∗). Since a∗ is Pareto efficient, it solves P(θ) for some nonzero θ ∈ Rn+
(this is a standard fact for concave problems). And therefore a∗ satisfies P(θ)’s system
of first-order conditions: θJ(a∗) = 0. By our normalization, J(a) = B(a) − I, where
I is the n-by-n identity matrix, so the system of first-order conditions is equivalent to
θB(a∗) = θ.
This equation says that B(a∗) has an eigenvalue of 1 with corresponding left-hand
eigenvector θ. Since B(a∗) is a nonnegative matrix, and irreducible by Assumption 3, the
Perron–Frobenius Theorem applies to it. That theorem says that the only eigenvalue of
B(a∗) that can be associated with the nonnegative eigenvector θ is the spectral radius
itself.45 Thus, the spectral radius of B(a∗) must be 1.
Conversely, suppose that B(a∗) has a spectral radius of 1, and again normalize each
i’s utility function so that Jii(a
∗) = −1. The Perron–Frobenius Theorem guarantees that
B(a∗) has 1 as an eigenvalue, and also yields the existence of a nonnegative left-hand
eigenvector θ such that θB(a∗) = θ. Consequently, the first-order conditions of the
Pareto problem P(θ) are satisfied (using the manipulation of the first-order conditions we
used above). By the assumption of concave utilities, it follows that a∗ solves the Pareto
problem for weights θ (i.e., the first-order conditions are sufficient for optimality), and so
a∗ is Pareto efficient.
We now prove part (ii), starting with the case in which B(0) is irreducible.
If r(B(0)) > 1, then Proposition 6 in Appendix B yields an egalitarian direction at 0
with bang for the buck exceeding 1; this is a Pareto improvement at 0.
If 0 is not Pareto efficient, there is an a′ ∈ Rn+ such that ui(a′) ≥ ui(0) for each i,
with strict inequality for some i. Using Assumption 3, namely the irreducibility of B(a′),
as well as the continuity of the ui, we can find
46 an a′′ with all positive entries so that
ui(a
′′) > ui(0) for all i. Let v denote the derivative of u(ζa′′) in ζ evaluated at ζ = 0.
This derivative is strictly positive in every entry, since (by convexity of the ui) the entry
vi must exceed [ui(a
′′)− ui(0)]/a′′i . By the chain rule, v = J(0)a′′. From the fact that v
45See part (iii) of the statement of the theorem in Section A.
46Suppose otherwise and let a′′ be chosen so that u(a′′)− u(0) ≥ 0 (note this is possible, since a′′ = a′
satisfies this inequality) and so that the number of 0 entries in u(a′′)− u(0) is as small as possible. Let
S be the set of i for which ui(a
′′)− ui(a) > 0. Then by irreducibility of benefits, we can find j ∈ S and
k /∈ S such that Jkj(0) > 0. Define a′′′j = a′′j + ε and a′′′i = a′′i for all i 6= j. If ε > 0 is chosen small
enough, then by continuity of the ui we have ui(a
′′′)−ui(a) > 0 for all i ∈ S, but also uk(a′′′)−uk(a) > 0,
contradicting the choice of a′′.
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is positive, we deduce via simple algebraic manipulation that there is a positive vector w
so that B(0)w > w. And from this it follows by the Collatz–Wielandt formula (Meyer,
2000, equation 8.3.3) that the spectral radius of B(0) exceeds 1.
Now assume B(0) is reducible.
First, suppose r(B(0)) > 1. Then the same is true when B(0) is replaced by one of
its irreducible blocks, and in that case a Pareto improvement on 0 (involving only the
agents in the irreducible block taking positive effort) is found as above. So 0 is not Pareto
efficient.
Conversely, suppose 0 is not Pareto efficient. There is an a′ ∈ R+ such that ui(a′) ≥
ui(0) for each i, with strict inequality for some i. Let P = {i : a′i > 0} be the set of
agents taking positive actions at a′. And let B̂(0) be obtained by restricting B(0) to P
(i.e. by throwing away rows and columns not corresponding to indices in P ). For each
i ∈ P , there is a j ∈ P such that B̂ij(0) > 0; otherwise, i would be worse off than at 0.
Therefore, each i ∈ P is on a cycle47 in B̂(0). And it follows that for each i ∈ P there
is a set Pi ⊆ P such that B̂(0) is irreducible when restricted to Pi. Next, applying the
argument of footnote 46 to each such Pi separately, we can find a
′′ such that ui(a′′) > ui(0)
for each i ∈ P . From this point we can argue as above48 to conclude that r(B̂(0)) > 1.
Since B̂(0) is a submatrix of B(0), by Fact 1, r(B(0)) > 1.
Proof of Theorem 1: We first prove the following Lemma.
Lemma 2. If a∗ 6= 0 is a Lindahl outcome for preference profile u, then a∗ ∈ Rn++.
Proof. Assume, toward a contradiction, that a∗ has some entries equal to 0. Let P be
the matrix of prices that support a∗ as a Lindahl outcome. Let S be the set of i so that
a∗i = 0, which is a proper subset of N since a
∗ 6= 0. By Assumption 3 (connectedness of
benefit flows), there is an i ∈ S and a j /∈ S so that Jij(a∗) > 0. We will argue that this
implies
Pij > 0.
If this were not true, then an a 6= a∗ in which only j increases his action slightly relative
to a∗ would satisfy BBi(P) in Definition 1 and be preferred by i to the outcome a∗,
contradicting the definition of a Lindahl outcome.
Now consider BBi(P), the budget balance condition of agent i, at the outcome a
∗:∑
k:k 6=i
Pika
∗
k ≤ a∗i
∑
k:k 6=i
Pki.
Since a∗i = 0, the right-hand side of this is 0. But Pij > 0, and a
∗
j > 0 (since j /∈ S), so
the left-hand side is positive. That is a contradiction. 
It will now be convenient to use an equivalent definition of Lindahl outcomes:
Definition 5. An action profile a∗ is a Lindahl outcome for a preference profile u if
there exists an n-by-n matrix P with each column summing to 0, so that the following
conditions hold for every i:
47Recall the definition in Section 3.2.
48The Collatz–Wielandt formula does not assume irreducibility.
36 MATTHEW ELLIOTT AND BENJAMIN GOLUB
(i) The inequality
(B̂Bi(P))
∑
j∈N
Pijaj ≤ 0
is satisfied when a = a∗;
(ii) for any a such that B̂Bi(P) is satisfied, we have ui(a
∗) ≥ ui(a).
Given a Lindahl outcome defined as in Definition 1, set Pii = −
∑
j:j 6=i Pji to find prices
satisfying the new definition.49 Conversely, the prices of Definition 5 work in Definition 1
without modification, since the original definition does not involve the diagonal terms of
P at all.
We now show (ii) implies (i). Suppose a∗ ∈ Rn+ is a nonzero Lindahl outcome. Lemma
2 implies that a∗ ∈ Rn++, or in other words that a∗ has only positive entries. Let P be the
matrix of prices satisfying the conditions of Definition 5. Consider the following program
for each i ∈ N , denoted by Πi(P):
maximize ui(a) subject to a ∈ Rn+ and B̂Bi(P).
By definition of a Lindahl outcome, a∗ solves Πi(P). By Assumption 3, there is some
agent j 6= i such that increases in his action aj would make i better off. Therefore, the
budget balance constraint B̂Bi(P) is satisfied with equality, so that Pa
∗ = 0. Because
a∗ is interior, the gradient of the maximand ui must be orthogonal to the constraint set
given by B̂Bi(P). In other words, row i of J(a
∗) is parallel to row i of P. These facts
together imply J(a∗)a∗ = 0 and so B(a∗)a∗ = a∗ (see Section 4.2.1).
We now show that (i) implies (ii). Since a∗ is a nonnegative right-hand eigenvector of
B(a∗), the Perron–Frobenius Theorem guarantees that 1 is a largest eigenvalue of B(a∗).
Arguing as in the proof of Proposition 1(i), we deduce that there is a nonzero vector θ for
which θJ(a∗) = 0. We need to find prices supporting a∗ as a Lindahl outcome. Define
the matrix P by Pij = θiJij(a
∗) and note that for all j ∈ N we have
(9)
∑
i∈N
Pij =
∑
i∈N
θiJij(a
∗) = [θJ(a∗)]j = 0,
where [θJ(a∗)]j refers to entry j of the vector θJ(a
∗).
Note that B(a∗)a∗ = a∗ implies J(a∗)a∗ = 0 and each row of P is just a scaling of the
corresponding row of J(a∗). We therefore have:
(10) Pa∗ = 0,
and these prices satisfy budget balance.
We claim that, for each i, the vector a∗ solves Πi(P). This is because the gradient of
ui at a
∗, which is row i of J(a∗), is normal to the constraint set by construction of P.
Moreover, by (10) above, a∗ satisfies the constraint B̂Bi(P). The claim then follows by
the concavity of ui.
Proof of Proposition 2: We will use the Kakutani Fixed Point Theorem to find a
centrality action profile. Define Y = {a ∈ Rn+ : mini[J(a)a]i > 0}, the set of action
49In essence, −Pii is the total subsidy agent i receives per unit of effort, equal to the sum of personalized
taxes paid by other people to him for his effort.
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profiles a at which everyone has positive gains from scaling a up. It is easy to check
that Y is convex.50 Also, Y is bounded by Assumption 4. Thus, Y , the closure of Y , is
compact.51
Define the correspondence F : Y \ {0}⇒ Y by
F (a) = {λa ∈ Y : λ ≥ 0 and min
i
[J(λa)a]i ≤ 0}.
This correspondence, at an argument a, has in its image all actions λa (i.e., on the same
ray as a) such that, at λa, at least one agent does not want to further scale up actions.
Finally, recalling the definition of deg(a) from Appendix B, define the correspondence
G : Y ⇒ Y by
G(a) = F (deg(a)).
Note that deg(a) is always nonzero, so that the argument of F is in its domain.52 The
function deg is continuous (Wilkinson, 1965, pp. 66–67), and F is clearly upper hemicon-
tinuous, so it follows that G is upper hemicontinuous. Finally, from the definitions of Y
and F it follows that F is nonempty-valued.53 Since Y is a compact and convex set, the
Kakutani Fixed Point Theorem implies that there is an a ∈ Y such that a ∈ F (deg(a)).
Writing â = deg(a), this means that there is some λ ≥ 0 such that mini[J(λâ)â]i ≤ 0. Let
a∗ = λâ. We will argue that a∗ satisfies scaling-indifference (and is therefore a centrality
action profile).
Suppose a∗ 6= 0. Then by continuity of the function λ 7→ J(λâ)â, there is some i for
which we have [J(a∗)â]i = 0, so that some player’s marginal benefit to scaling is equal to
his marginal cost. Since â is an egalitarian direction at the action profile a∗, the equation
[J(a∗)â]i = 0 must hold for all i, and therefore J(a∗)â = 0. Since â and a∗ are parallel,
we deduce J(a∗)a∗ = 0. The condition J(a∗)a∗ = 0 and Assumption 3—connectedness of
benefit flows—imply that a∗ ∈ Rn++.
If a∗ = 0, consider the bang for the buck vector b(0, â), which corresponds to starting
at 0 and moving in the egalitarian direction â. Because â is egalitarian, we can write
b(0, â) = b1 for some b. And we can deduce that b is no greater than 1—otherwise, F (â)
would not contain a∗ = 0. By Proposition 6, it follows that r(B(0)) ≤ 1. Then 0 is
Pareto efficient by Proposition 1(ii).
50Given a,a′ ∈ Y and λ ∈ [0, 1], define a′′ = λa+ (1− λ)a′. Note that for all i ∈ N and ε ≥ −1
ui((1 + ε)a
′′) ≥ λui((1 + ε)a) + (1− λ)ui((1 + ε)a′)
by concavity of the ui. Differentiating in ε at ε = 0 yields the result.
51It is tempting to define Y = {a ∈ Rn+ : mini[J(a)a]i ≥ 0} instead and avoid having to take closures; but
this set can be unbounded even when Y as we defined it above is bounded. For example, our assumptions
do not exclude the existence of an (infinite) ray along which mini[J(a)a]i = 0.
52Even though the domain of F is not a compact set, G is a correspondence from a compact set into
itself.
53Toward a contradiction, take a nonzero a such that F (a) is empty. Let λ be the maximum λ such that
λa ∈ Y ; such a λ exists because a is nonzero and Y is compact. Since J(λa)a > 0 it follows that for all i,
dui((1 + ε)λa)
dε
∣∣∣∣
ε=0
> 0,
from which it follows that (λ + δ)a ∈ Y for small enough δ. This contradicts the choice of λ (recalling
the definition of Y ).
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Proof of Proposition 3: Let W↑i (`; M) be the set of all walks of length ` in a matrix
M starting at i, so that w(1) = i. The proof follows immediately from the following
observation.
Fact 2. For any irreducible, nonnegative matrix Q, and any i, j
pi
pj
= lim
`→∞
∑
w∈W↑i (`;Q) v(w; Q)∑
w∈W↑j (`;Q) v(w; Q)
,
where p is any nonnegative right-hand eigenvector of Q (i.e. a right-hand Perron vector
in the terminology of Section A).
Proof. Note that the formula above is equivalent to
(11)
pi
pj
= lim
`→∞
∑
k
[
Q`
]
ik∑
k [Q
`]jk
,
where
[
Q`
]
ik
denotes the entry in the (i, k) position of the matrix Q`. To prove (11), let
ρ = r(Q) and note that
(12) lim
`→∞
(Q/ρ)` = wTp,
where w is a left-hand Perron vector of Q, and p is a right-hand Perron vector (recall
Section A). This is statement (8.3.13) in Meyer (2000); the hypothesis that Q is primitive
in that statement follows from the assumed aperiodicity of Q (see Theorems 1 and 2 of
Perkins (1961)). To conclude, observe that (12) directly implies (11). 
To prove the proposition from Fact 2, set Q = B(a) = MT and note that then the
right-hand side of the equation in Fact 2 is equal to the right-hand side of the equation
in Proposition 3. The statement that a has the centrality property is equivalent to the
statement that a is a right-hand Perron eigenvector of Q = B(a).
Proof of Lemma 1: Suppose this does not hold, and let M be the nonempty set of
all i such that Jii(a
∗)θi = 0. By Assumption 3, if M is not the set of all agents, there is
some i ∈ M and j /∈ M with Jij(a∗) > 0, which implies θj = 0, a contradiction to the
definition of M . If M is the set of all agents, then let J˜ be equal to J(a∗; û) with the
diagonal zeroed out, and note that J˜ is an irreducible, nonnegative matrix with θJ˜ = 0,
again a contradiction (since θ was assumed to be nonzero).
Proof of Proposition 5: For j ∈M set
mj(a) = θ
−1
j
∑
i/∈M
θiJij(a
∗)aj.
One can check that with these payments, the problem of maximizing∑
j∈M
θju˜j(a)
has the same first-order conditions evaluated at a∗ as the planner’s problem in the grand
coalition, which are ∑
i∈N
θiJij(a
∗) = 0 for each j.
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So the social planner’s problem in group M , of maximizing the weighted sum of utilities
(u˜)i∈N , is solved by a = a∗. Because the utility functions are concave, the solution is,
indeed, Pareto efficient for a∗. The analogous argument holds for M c.
Appendix D. Additional Results
Proposition 7. The following are equivalent:
(i) r(B(0)) ≤ 1;
(ii) 0 is a Pareto efficient action profile;
(iii) 0 is a Lindahl outcome.
Proof. Proposition 1(ii) establishes the equivalence between (i) and (ii).
(ii) ⇒ (iii): The construction of prices is exactly analogous to the proof of Theorem 1;
the only difference is that rather than the Pareto weights, we use Pareto weights adjusted
by the Lagrange multipliers on the binding constraints ai ≥ 0.
(iii) ⇒ (ii): The standard proof of the First Welfare Theorem goes through without
modification; see, e.g., Foley (1970).

Appendix E. Essential versus Key Players
In this appendix we compare the concept of a key player from Ballester et al. (2006)
with our concept of essential agents, as defined in Section 3.2. Suppose there are four
agents with the following utilities:
u1 = 10a3 −0.5a21 +a1a4
u2 = 10a1 −0.5a22 +a2a4
u3 = 10a2 −0.5a23 +a3a4
u4 = a4 −0.5a24
If all agents take actions greater than zero, these utilities induce a benefits network
shown below, where an arrow from i to j means
∂uj
∂ai
> 0.
3
1
4
2
Figure 4. The benefits matrix in our example.
It is easy to see that the unique Nash equilibrium is a∗1 = a
∗
2 = a
∗
3 = a
∗
4 = 1. Following
the exercise in Ballester et al. (2006) suppose player 4 is “removed” from the network so
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that player 4 becomes disconnected, providing no benefits to the other players:
u1 = 10a3 −0.5a21 +a1a4
u2 = 10a1 −0.5a22 +a2a4
u3 = 10a2 −0.5a23 +a3a4
u4 = a4 −0.5a24
In this new network, the unique Nash equilibrium is a∗1 = a
∗
2 = a
∗
3 = 0, while a
∗
4 = 1.
Therefore, the removal of player 4 decreases the actions by all other players. Suppose
instead player i 6= 4 were removed. In the network the unique Nash equilibrium is a∗j = 1
for all j 6= i and xi = 0. Thus, the action profile after player 4 is removed is pointwise
dominated by the action profile after any other player is removed. And so aggregate
actions decrease the most when player 4 is removed, which implies that player 4 the key
player, as defined by Ballester et al. (2006), .
Consider now whether a Pareto improvement is possible at the Nash equilibrium action
profile. By Proposition 1 this is possible if and only if the spectral radius of the benefits
matrix is greater than 1. In the essential player exercise we remove a player from negotia-
tions by having that player take his status quo action—in this case, his Nash equilibrium
action. Because this player is unable to provide positive marginal benefits to anyone else,
we remove him from the benefits network when looking for Pareto improvements. In the
subnetwork without player 4, the spectral radius is greater than 1, and so a Pareto im-
provement is possible and player 4 is not an essential player. However, in the subnetwork
without any player i 6= 4 the spectral radius is 0 and so a Pareto improvement is not
possible. Thus all players i 6= 4 are essential.
In summary, player 4 is the key player while all other players, and not player 4, are
essential. What makes a player “key” in Ballester, Calv-Armengol, Zenou (2006) is the
complementarity of his action with the actions of others. Player 4 is the only player with
such complementarities, since the other players i 6= 4 have terms xix4 in their utility
functions. In contrast, what makes a player “essential” is his position in cycles in the
benefits network. When i 6= 4 is removed, the benefits network has no cycles and so such
players are essential. In contrast, when player 4 is removed, there is still a strong cycle
among the remaining players in the benefits network.
